ARSoS: An adaptive, robust, and sub-optimal strategy for automated deployment of anomaly detection system in MANETs by Zhang, Z et al.
ARSoS: an Adaptive, Robust and Sub-optimal
Strategy for Automated Deployment of Anomaly
Detection System in MANETs
Zonghua Zhang, Farid Naı¨t-Abdesselam, and Soufiene Djahel
IRCICA/LIFL - CNRS UMR 8022 - INRIA
University of Sciences and Technologies of Lille, France
Abstract—While a variety of AIDS (Anomaly-based Intrusion
Detection system) are claimed to be fully distributed, light-weight,
and ready for application, their detection cost are not always
neglectable, especially considering the fact that MANET nodes
have scarce resource, which usually impels the nodes to save their
energy from any unnecessary action. It is therefore a significant
issue to deploy AIDS sensors in an optimal way for achieving the
best tradeoff between detection cost and performance. However,
this optimization problem is challenging in essence because of the
special characteristics of MANETs. In particular, the deployment
strategy must be adaptive to capture nodes mobility and robust
to the failure of detection agents resulted from either accidental
system error or intentional subversion. In this paper, we propose
an adaptive, robust and sub-optimal strategy, which is called
ARSoS, for tackling this issue. ARSoS treats each AIDS sensor
as an independent agent, and then formulates their cooperative
behavior as a decentralized decision problem. Since each AIDS
sensor is only aware of partial information about the other
sensors and the neighboring nodes, a reward signal integrating
both local observation and global detection is introduced to guide
their cooperation with one another. An online policy gradient
algorithm is then applied to solve the formulated problem. An
ARSoS prototype is implemented for simulations, and the results
validate its performance in terms adaptability, robustness and
optimality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the rapid development
and wide-spread application of Mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs), which significantly enhance access to Internet
services and provide various means for ubiquitous computing
that enables high-speed and high-quality information exchange
between mobile/portable devices located anywhere in the
globe. Despite the tremendous potential and far-reaching im-
pacts on the revolution of human life, MANETs suffer from
security and privacy issues which dramatically impede their
applications. To cope with the attacks, a large variety of intru-
sion detection techniques such as authentication, authorization,
cryptographic protocols, key management schemes have been
developed. However, most of them have high probabilities
of being compromised due to various vulnerabilities resulted
by open medium and wireless communication, as well as
malicious insiders. As one of the backup measures, intrusion
detection and response have paramount significance in the
second defense line of MANET security.
While many intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been
developed for wired networks, most of them can not de applied
directly to MANETs due to the special characteristics of
the infrastructure and the communication mode of MANETs
that may lead to different vulnerabilities from traditional
network paradigms, and it has been shown that anomaly-
based IDS (AIDS) rather than misuse-based IDS is more
suitable to diagnose anomalous nodes in MANETs. Also, since
MANETs are self-policing and nodes are autonomous, fully
distributed architectures are required for monitoring, reporting
and tracking anomalous events, that is, AIDS sensors must
be decentralized. While a variety of AIDS are claimed to
be fully distributed, light-weight, and ready for application,
their detection cost are not always neglectable, especially
considering the fact that MANET nodes have scarce resource,
which usually impels the nodes to save their energy from any
unnecessary action. It is therefore a significant issue to deploy
AIDS sensors in an optimal manner for achieving the best
tradeoff between detection cost and performance. However,
this optimization problem is challenging in essence due to the
special characteristic and communication mode of MANETs.
For example, the deployment strategy must be adaptive in
that network topology always under changes caused by nodes
mobility, and the deployment must be robust against the
accidental communication failure due to the signal noise,
channel interference, and traffic congestion. More seriously,
some sophisticated attackers may manage to undermine AIDS
by eavesdropping, capturing and analyzing AIDS sensors.
By tackling the technical challenges, we propose an adap-
tive, robust and sub-optimal strategy, which is called ARSoS,
for automated deployment of AIDS sensors in MANETs.
ARSoS is built on a sound theoretical framework, in which
each AIDS sensor is treated as independent agent, and their
cooperative behavior is formulated as a decentralized deci-
sion problem. In particular, since each AIDS sensor is only
aware of partial information about the other sensors and the
ongoing states of the network, a reward signal integrating
both local observation (e.g., location, remaining energy) and
global detection (e.g., detection performance, detection cost) is
introduced to guide their individual behavior and cooperation
with one another. Based on the model formulation, Multi-agent
Partially Observable Markov Detection Process (MPO-MDP),
we then employ a policy gradient algorithm to practically
infer sensor behavior that is essentially controlled by a set of
parameters, with the objective for achieving the best trade-
off between detection cost and detection performance. In
order to validate the performance of ARSoS, we implement
one prototype upon a reputation-based AIDS and conduct
simulations to demonstrate its performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II reviews the related works. We put forth the deployment
problem in Section III by giving observations, practical as-
sumptions, and formal definition. Section IV addresses the
specific design of our deployment strategy ARSoS. Section
V reports simulations and discusses the results.
II. RELATED WORK
A number of intrusion detection techniques and architec-
tures for MANETs have been reported in [9], [10], [17],
which suggest that the design of an IDS in MANETs mainly
contains three elements: collecting and monitoring observa-
tions for characterizing node behavior and building normal
profiles; designing classification algorithms for discriminating
the deviation between ongoing network activity and normal
profiles; developing models and architectures for exchanging,
correlating and aggregating IDS alerts. In addition to intrusion
detection, a set of response must be followed automatically
for mitigating the detected anomalies. Intrusion detection and
response therefore can be tightly integrated into a single
model. For example, reputation-based system [7], [8], [18]
introduces reputation to characterize the behavior of network
nodes in terms of particular performance metrics, such as
packet-forwarding rates. The periodical update of reputation
allows the system to punish anomalous nodes whose reputation
falls below a certain threshold. An alternative is to design
fine-grained detection models by specifically analyzing routing
protocols [15]. No matter what kind of detection techniques,
a common assumption for them is that detection architectures
should be fully distributed, and usually the detection (and
response) cost is neglectable. Also, the performance evaluation
of these systems solely relies on simulations, while sound the-
oretical analysis attracts much less attention than it deserves.
Game-theoretical framework is used in [2], [12] for analyz-
ing the performance of detection schemes (as well as attack
schemes). While the given theoretical bounds may help us to
gain insightful understanding on optimal attacker behaviors,
the emphasis of these work is not on computational cost
consumed by defenders. Based on the assumption that mobile
nodes are reluctant to run IDS detection algorithms for saving
their energy, a mechanism design-based scheme is proposed
in [11] for electing IDS nodes. The objective of this scheme is
to balance the detection cost by urging more powerful nodes
(which tend to selfish) to run detection algorithms and thus
make the weaker nodes live longer. The scheme is built on
IDS, while it does no take into account the performance of
IDS, neither the adaptability issue. A fundamental difference
between our scheme and the existing work is that our scheme
treats IDS and underlying network together by integrating both
nodes status and detection algorithms into a single model.
In particular, our strategy aims at achieving the best trade-
off between detection performance and detection cost, it also
deals with network-level factors including nodes mobility
and communication errors. In addition, although the current
version of our scheme is developed upon a reputation-based
AIDS, its independent architecture and friendly interface allow
it to be easily extended to the other AIDSs in MANETs.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we show how to formulate the deployment
of AIDS sensors as an optimization problem. Prior to that,
we give key observations, design motivation and assumptions,
by taking into account the practical implementation issues of
AIDS in MANETs.
A. Key observations and motivation
Since MANET is self-policing, each node behaves as an
autonomous entity and cooperates each other to fulfil network
functions, there is no infrastructure to support centralized
AIDS. As such, AIDS must be decentralized, that is, AIDS
sensors must be fully distributed upon the nodes to cover the
whole network. Furthermore, as MANET nodes are usually
resource-constrained, the operational cost associate with detec-
tion and response must be minimal, or neglectable compared
to the regular computational overhead. We also have a number
of significant observations by examining the existing AIDSs,
as follows,
• each AIDS has its own detection coverage and blind spot,
which relies not only on detection algorithms but also on
observations, i.e, the observable subjects under monitor,
as well as their data-centric properties.
• since MANETs nodes are resources-constrained, AIDS
sensors are usually light-weight and cost-sensitive, while
the detection cost and latency are not always neglectable
when an AIDS is considered as a whole.
• as MANET is self-policing, infrastructureless, and mo-
bile, AIDS is expected to be self-adaptive to capture the
drifts of network normality.
• there are a number of trade offs need to be tuned for
achieving better detection performance, such as detection
accuracy and false alert, anticipated performance and
computational cost.
The key observations motivate us to explore a significant
and challenging issue, that is, the optimal deployment of AIDS
sensors in MANETs. In particular, we wonder whether it is
a compelling need to fully deploy AIDS sensors on all the
nodes or a majority of nodes, or is it possible to achieve an
acceptable detection performance with fewer AIDS sensors
and less detection cost. In addition to the optimality, robustness
and adaptability are also key properties need to be examined
carefully. We envision a framework which can provide the
theoretical foundation for examining the relationship between
detection cost and performance, along with a set of adaptive,
robust and optimal deployment strategies for achieving the best
tradeoff between the two metrics.
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Fig. 1. Deployment of AIDS sensors: node B,C, F turns on their sensors
at time t, while A,D, F turns on their sensors at time t+1; each node need
to make decision whether its sensor should be turned on or turned off by
estimating its local operating environment and global detection performance
of AIDS on the entire network
B. Assumptions and Problem formulation
We assume that AIDS sensors operate independently from
the underlying network, and cooperate each other to detect
intrusive events. However, each AIDS sensor is only aware of
its local environment, the detection coverage of a particular
AIDS sensor is therefore limited, and they must exchange the
local observation for obtaining global overviews. In addition,
the detection results of each AIDS sensor must be aggregated
for achieving accurate results and suppressing false alerts.
Henceforth, both the local detection and global aggregation
are important for an AIDS. However, while the functionality
is always one of the key performance metric of AIDS, the
computational cost can never be ignored. For a distributed
AIDS with certain detection capability, its deployment strategy
has great impact on computational overhead.
We also assume that AIDS sensors are fully distributed in
MANET so that each node is able to run detection algorithm.
But they can either switch on or off AIDS sensor (Fig. 1
illustrate the operations). Formally, we assume a MANET has
N nodes (where the network size can be changed) and M
AIDS sensors need to be switched on at time t for monitoring
the whole network. In addition, we generally assume that the
detection cost associated with an AIDS deployment strategy
p ∈ P is Cp, our objective is therefore simply represented as
follows,
arg min
0<M≤N
Cp (1)
This equation also implies the relationship between the number
of AIDS sensors M and deployment strategy p, where M is
usually less than N . Theoretically, there is a set of deployment
strategies P ′ ⊆ P which can minimize Cp. However, in prac-
tice, the special characteristics of MANETs make it impossible
to explore a deterministic relationship between M and Cs,
thus optimal solutions are not readily available. Rather, on the
basis of our assumptions and specific considerations, which
are treated as practical constraints, we use meta-heuristic
algorithms to solve this optimization problem.
IV. OUR PROPOSED STRATEGY: ARSOS
This section discusses our specific design, ARSoS. We
firstly formulate the general behavior of AIDS sensors as a
multiple agent partially observable markov decision process, or
MPO-MDP, we then apply an online policy gradient algorithm
to practically infer the collective behaviors of AIDS sensors.
A. Design requirements
Our design is primarily from the perspective of AIDS that
runs constantly and remains independent or transparent to the
network, enhancing the quality of service associated with secu-
rity. In general, AIDS should be effective in terms of detection
accuracy and efficient in terms of computational cost. While
our design aims at improving AIDS performance by balancing
the two metrics, the following design requirements must be
examined carefully,
• the design should not cause much extra computational
cost, and it should not result in performance deterioration.
• the design should not introduce new vulnerabilities.
• the design should be robust and resist subversion, that
is, the failure of any AIDS sensor should not result in
performance degradation.
• the design should be adaptive to the changing environ-
ment that is mainly caused by nodes mobility.
Our design treats AIDS as a whole and as an self-policing
system, in which detection sensors are autonomous and behave
independently. After a certain period of monitor process and
based on the local observations, each sensor makes a decision
on the occurrence of an anomalous event. Since each sensor
works in its own operating environment, it can only be aware
of its local area and thus have no global knowledge about
the entire network. The sensors, therefore, have to exchange
their personal opinions for achieving a global overview. To
do that, a set of efficient and effective aggregation protocols
and consensus mechanisms is usually required. However,
the explicit communications among AIDS sensors must be
avoided because they may cost extra computational overhead,
which is against the design requirement listed above.
B. Design rationale
For each AIDS sensor, its estimate on the current state, as
well as the potential action, depends on the previous state, so
the decision process is a Markov decision process. Also, each
sensor can partially observe the ongoing network state, while
a general state of the entire network can be only estimated
and maintained by the multiple AIDS sensors, by collecting
and integrating their observations together. Therefore, the
collective behavior of multiple AIDS sensors can be essentially
formulated as Multi-agent Partially Observable Markov Deci-
sion Process, or MPO-MDP for short. Formally, a POMDP
model is structurally characterized by four key elements [1]:
a finite state space S, an action space U , an observation space
Z, and a (possibly stochastic) reward r(i) ∈ R for each state
si ∈ S, i.e., M = {S,U, Z,R}.
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As a POMDP model, the interaction between an individual
AIDS sensor idx and its operating environment includes a
sequence of decision stages, working as follows,
• at stage i, the local network monitored by idx is in a
particular state si ∈ S, and the monitored observation is
zi ∈ Z (we assume the observation is generated with a
certain probability distribution ν(si)),
• motivated by the observed zi, sensor idx takes action
in accordance with a randomized policy based on a
probability distribution µ(zi) over actions,
• the action ui ∈ U determines the state transitions from
si to sj , with a certain probability pij(ui),
• after taking the action and with a certain delay, sensor
idx receives a reward signal ri ∈ R, while the objective
of sensor idx is to choose a policy for maximizing a
predefine reward function.
Therefore, in general, the decision process of each AIDS
sensor can be regarded as a Markov chain: si ∈ S[ν(si)] →
zi ∈ Z[µ(zi)] → ui ∈ U [pij ] → sj ∈ S. The principle is
that AIDS sensors need to search the policy space which is a
mapping from current state to actions.
With the formulation of AIDS sensor’s independent behav-
ior, the entire AIDS system can be naturally formulated as a
multi-agent POMDP, or MPO-MDP. Formally, the action set of
AIDS U contains the cross product of all the individual AIDS
sensor’s action, that is, U = {uˆi|uˆi = u1i × u2i × · · · × umi }
(where m is the number of AIDS sensors). At each stage,
each AIDS sensor selects its action independently according
to an observation vector, which then combines a general
action of AIDS. For stochastic policies, the overall action
distribution is the joint distribution of actions for each sensor,
µ(u1, u2, ...un|z1, z2, ...zn). Although we need to consider the
practical constraints and specific characteristic of MANETs,
the model formulation has a number of promising advantages,
• the cooperation among AIDS sensors does not take into
account their explicit inter-communication, since only a
reward signal is shared, enabling AIDS to adapt to diverse
network situations,
• the distributed architecture allows any AIDS sensor to
leave and be incorporated into the detection system
without any extra operation, enabling its scalability to
the changing network topology,
• since AIDS essentially considers the individual behav-
ior of sensor as a whole, the consensus strategy and
agreement protocol may achieve reliable decisions in the
presence of sensor’s Byzantine behavior,
• since the cooperation manner among AIDS sensors is
formulated as an optimization problem, the inferred col-
lective behavior may maximally increases the rewards,
eventually leading to a set of optimal (or near-optimal)
decision strategies,
• there is a suit of algorithms ready for solving the formu-
lated problem, e.g., a policy-gradient reinforcement learn-
ing algorithm can be applied to tackle the delayed reward,
partially observable, multi-agent learning problem.
C. Model Construction
Model construction is a process of specifying model-base
parameters. Except the reward signal, we consider the other
parameters independently for each AIDS sensor. We assume
each sensor collects and maintains three observations,
• link state, which reflects the status of network topology;
• reputation, which denotes the node reputation;
• power, which measures the node’s remaining resource.
Let θ=(θ1, θ2, θ3) be a parameter vector serving as thresholds
for the three observations. For example, we have link state =
1 if θ1 > #neighbor(i)t/#neighbor(i)t−1 which represents
the changing ratio of the neighbors of node i from time t− 1
to t, and node i is supposed to run AIDS sensor in this case;
also, we say node i can not serve as an AIDS sensor if its
reputation less than threshold θ2, or its power is not sufficient
to achieve the lower bound θ3 for running AIDS sensor. The
observation space of the model is therefore Z = {link state :
0, link state : 1, reputation : 0, reputation : 1, power : 0,
power : 1}, and the state space S is directly derived from Z.
The action space is defined as U = {0, 1, 2, ...umax}, where
ui = 0 means AIDS sensor is off, ui = k means sensor AIDS
may keep running for k time windows.
To make the model complete, we need to define the reward
signal r. Considering the behavior of AIDS sensor and its
detection results, two items are absorbed into our reward
function: the computational cost C for running detection
engine, and the gratitude tokens G from the other nodes for the
provided AIDS service. The service can be further classified
into two cases, positive Gpos (good service) and negative Gneg
(bad service). Formally, we define reward function as follows,
r = G− C = Gpos −Gneg − C (2)
So Eq. (1) can be replaced by the following one,
max
p∈P
{ lim
T→∞
E[
1
T
T∑
t=1
rt]} (3)
where E is the expectation operator, and rt relates reward
signal r to the deployment strategy at time t. Obviously, this
objective function has two implications,
1) from a long-standing viewpoint, the ultimate goal is to
maximize the reward r by taking the optimal deployment
strategies,
2) the action of AIDS sensor U is also essentially related
to the reward signal via G, so the actions of each AIDS
can be optimized simultaneously.
Note that reward signal is a parameter integrating both local
and global elements. In particular, in Eq. (2), G is global
element, while C is local element. To make it general, we
may introduce an impact factor α ∈ [0, 1] to balance the two
elements, that is,
r = α · (Gpos −Gneg)− (1− α) · C (4)
As such, the behavior of a AIDS sensor is impacted by
both its available computational resource and evaluation on its
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Fig. 2. An AIDS sensor behaves as POMDP model: it collects observations
Z from a group of nodes in its vicinity periodically, takes actions according
to the detection result (the system estimate S), and then it receives feedback
(G and C) as the evaluation of its action consequence; the edge numbers
show the decision sequence.
behavior from other nodes, and their coordination may achieve
optimal deployment globally. Fig. 2 illustrates the behavior of
a typical AIDS sensor acting as the constructed model.
D. A policy gradient algorithm
One problem naturally aries after the model construction,
i.e., how can we practically infer the deployment strategy p
from the constructed models. To do that, we need to design
suitable algorithms for maximizing objective function Eq. (3).
While a bunch of reinforcement learning algorithms are avail-
able for solving MPO-MDP models [1], the characteristic of
MANETs and our design requirements call for a fast and light-
wight one. Baxter and Bartlett presented OLPOMDP [5], [6],
an algorithm that learns to adjust the parameters θ of a random-
ized policy with observation zt, and chooses actions according
to µθ(zt). Henceforth, let η(θ) := limT→∞ E[ 1T
∑T
t=1 rt],
Eq. (3) is transformed into such a problem: adjusting policy
parameters θ to climb the gradient of η(θ) (the theoretical
foundation can be referred in [5]).
As defined previously, in our model, θ is the concatenation
of the parameters from an AIDS sensor. So a critical issue here
is how to relate parameter θ with AIDS sensor behavior (or
policy) µ(zt), or how to get µθ(zt). As our objective is to save
the overall computational cost for running AIDS sensors by
seeking their optimal deployment strategies, the occurrence
of switching off AIDS sensor for a node is rare but have
many opportunities to happen, it is practical and reasonable
to assume this probability as a poisson distribution. Also,
such a parameterized policy structure defines the probability
of choosing a particular action which is a continuous differen-
tiable function of θ, supporting the application of OLPOMDP
[5]. Moreover, this assumption allows the sensor to be trainable
and keep the computations simple,
Pr(ut = 0) =
exp(−f(θ, ut))f(θ, ut)0
0!
= exp(−f(θ, ut))
(5)
where f(θ, ut) further explores the direct relationship between
action ut and parameter θ, varying in the impact of θi on ut.
An ideal function is expected to correlate each element of θ
with ut in a fine way so that they can be adjusted simultane-
ously. However, to keep the analysis and simulation simper, in
our model, we only consider the relationship between θ3,t and
ut (we use θ3,t instead of θ3 means that θt,3 is trainable and
different from the other two parameters), while θ1 and θ2 are
determined in advance. So assuming the observation at time t
is zt = (zt,1, zt,2, zt,3), we have the following equation,
ut =
{
k, if zt,1 > θ1, zt,2 > θ2, and zt,3 > θt,3
0, otherwise (6)
where k = {1, 2, · · ·, umax}, and the exact value can be
determined by θt,3 with the positive values of θ1 and θ2 that
have been predefined as constants. Considering the physical
meaning of θt,3, i.e., the available resource of a node at time t,
we give a simple equation for relating θt,3 and zt,3, as follows,
ut =
zt,3 − θt,3 − δ · zt,3
θt,3
(7)
where δ · zt,3 plays as a relaxable coefficient for representing
the consumed power other than running AIDS sensor, and
the equation only holds when parameters θ1 and θ1 are
satisfied. By introducing Eq. (7) to Eq. (5), we can derive
a parameterizable police µθ(zt) for AIDS sensors,
µθ(zt) =
{
exp(− zt,3−θt,3−δ·zt,3θt,3 ), if ut = 0,
1− exp(− zt,3−θt,3−δ·zt,3θt,3 ), otherwise
(8)
In order to get an optimal policy µθ(zt), we need to seek the
best controlling parameter θ. A simple method for computing
an appropriate direction for update the parameter θ has been
proposed and applied in [4], [14], which works as the follows,
θt = θt−1 +4θ = θt−1 + τt · rt · qt (9)
where the long-term average of the updates 4θ lie in the
gradient direction ∇η(θ), rt is the sum of the rewards that
have been received, τt is the suitable size of the steps taken
in parameter space, and the vector qt is an eligibility trace
of the same dimensionality as θ, and it is used to update the
parameter θ and guides the policy µθ(zt) to climb the gradient
of the average reward. In particular, vector qt is computed and
updated in the following way,
qt+1 = ρ · qt + ∇µθ(zt)
µθ(zt)
(10)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1), µθ(zt) is the probability of the action
ut under the current policy, and ∇ denotes the gradient
with respect to the parameters θ. By introducing Eq. (8)
to Eq. (10) and then to Eq. (9), we can update the pa-
rameter step by step and therefore gradually achieve the
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optimal policy µ∗θ(zt). The algorithm works as follows,
Initialization coefficient ρ ∈ [0, 1), step size τ0, initial
thresholds θ0, observations z0
for episode t = 1 to T do
Gets observation zt;
Takes action ut;
Reports detection results;
Receives reward signal rt;
Updates qt+1 according to Eq. (8) and Eq. (10):
if ut = 0 then
qt+1 = ρ · qt − (1−δ)·ztθ2t
else
qt+1 = ρ · qt + (1−δ)·zt·exp(1−
(1−δ)·zt
θt
)
θ2t (1−exp(1− (1−δ)·ztθt ))
end
Updates θit+1 according to Eq. (9):
θt+1 = θt + τt · rt · qt+1
end
Algorithm 1: AIDS sensor-critic policy gradient algorithm
Note that the parameter θt in the algorithm is actually θt,3
in our model, and the right side of qt update is the results
by introducing Eq. (8) to Eq. (10). The key feature of the
algorithm is that the only non-local information each AIDS
sensor needs is a global reward signal, and they do not need
to know any other information about the system state in order
to climb the gradient of the global average reward.
E. Practical considerations
The application of OLPOMDP algorithm to our model
requires two implicit assumptions, (1) For every given θ, the
system is ergodic and converges to a unique steady state;
(2) the update of parameter θ of each AIDS sensor may
contribute to a global optimal cooperation between them. The
second assumption can be validated by the proof in [3], [5],
while the first assumption is often yet not always satisfied.
However, although the mobility of nodes in MANETs does
not support the occurrence of a steady state, the algorithm
anyways tends to converge to such a state, a “near-optimal”
state can happen with a certain probability. In general, the
application of reinforcement learning algorithm poses three
important features,
• Adaptability. In our model, reward signal is the only in-
formation shared by the sensors, and the cooperation does
not take into account the explicit inter-communication
between sensors. This allows every sensor to adapt to
diverse system conditions and can capture the node
mobility.
• Robustness. Since AIDS considers all the independent
sensors as a whole, it can make correct decisions with a
high probability even though in the presence of Byzantine
behaving nodes.
• sub-Optimality. The cooperation between AIDS sensors
is essentially formulated as an optimization problem with
the objective function Eq. (1) and some practical con-
straints. The simple update rule modifies the parameters
of each AIDS sensor in the direction that maximally
TABLE I
SIMULATION SETTINGS
Network Area 1000m × 1000m
Topology random
Placement of nodes uniform
MAC 802.11b
Routing protocol DSR
Node # of nodes 30
# of normal nodes 23
# of malicious nodes 7
# of pre-trusted nodes 6
# of anomaly detectors 30
initial energy 10
Attacks DoS Packet dropping
Simulation # of simulation epochs 20
running time 5000s
Length of detection window (lDW ) 20s
Parameters θ (0.50, 0.65, 0.60)
α 0.3
increases the average reward, which leads to parame-
ter values that locally optimize the performance of the
independent sensors. The general behavior of AIDS is
thus anticipated to be found a set of optimal deployment
strategies by turning on and off corresponding sensors.
The flexible network topologies determines that only sub-
optimal policy can be obtained even though optimal ones
are theoretically achievable given a particular topology
and sufficient time.
V. PERFORMANCE VALIDATION
In this section, we conduct simulations to validate the
performance of our proposed scheme, with the particular
concern on its adaptivity, robustness, and optimality.
A. Simulation Settings
Since the objective of our simulation is to examine the
deployment strategies of AIDS sensors in MANET, we con-
duct it with our reputation-based system RARDAR that has
been report in [18], where reputation is used to characterize
the behavior of nodes. The simulation settings follow the one
in [18] with minor modifications, as shown in Table I.
1) Network model: We consider a typical MANETs is
consisted of mobile nodes. The MAC layer operates IEEE
802.11b, and the network layer runs DSR routing protocol.
The application layer uses CBR for generating data packets
(6/Sec.). 50 source-destination connections are randomly and
periodically (10 seconds) generated among the nodes. The
network is randomly deployed in a space of 1000×1000 m2.
Also, we select Random Waypoint Mobility Model to simulate
the node mobility, and the node speed is randomly generated
between 0 and 20 m/s.
2) Node model: We assume the network to have 30 mobile
nodes, among which 23 are benign and 7 are malicious (which
launches DDoS attacks by dropping routing packets). We
select 6 pre-trusted nodes by setting high reputation values
(0.99) and the initial reputation of the rest nodes is 0.50. We
also assume that all nodes are location-aware and identified by
IP addresses. All the nodes are equipped with AIDS sensors,
while at the beginning of the simulation, we only switch on 6
AIDS sensors located at pre-trusted nodes.
6
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Fig. 3. Adaptability: measuring the detection performance of ARSoS in
different scenarios where nodes have different pause time; the longer of the
pause time the more stable of network topology and the better of ARSoS
performance.
3) Evaluation metrics: While a common criteria for evalu-
ating AIDS is the trade-off between the capability of detecting
attacks and the ability of suppressing false alerts, we mainly
examine the performance of our deployment strategy of AIDS
under particular network scenarios (the detection performance
have been validated in our previous work [18]). More specifi-
cally, we use adaptability to measure the performance of AIDS
in the presence of node mobility; robustness is used to measure
the performance of AIDS in the presence of failed sensors
(caused either by attacks or system errors); we then use a more
general metric, optimality, to observe whether a particular
deployment strategy is optimal in sense that the detection cost
and performance are balanced. To guide the evolution of AIDS
sensor behavior, the reward signal in Eq. (4) is defined by the
detection accuracy and false positive rate.
4) Time units: 20 simulation epochs are executed for av-
eraged results, and each of them lasts 5000s. The duration of
detection window is set as lDW = 20s, so there are totally
|DW | = 500020 = 250 detection windows available. ARSoS
starts running at the first detection window, and the malicious
nodes start dropping packets at the 151th detection window.
B. Results and analysis
Firstly, we examined the performance of ARSoS on adapt-
ability by varying the pause time of mobile nodes. The number
of nodes running AIDS sensors was initially set as 6 (all are
pre-trusted nodes), Fig. 3 shows that the detection performance
(represented by ROC) in terms of detection accuracy and false
positive rate did not have significant changes as pause time
varied, even though slight performance deterioration occurred
as the pause time tends to shorter. Careful analysis reveals
two reasons leading to this trend: the first one is from ARSoS
algorithm itself, since it has less time to achieve a better
performance although it could do if time is sufficient; the
second one is from reputation-based detection scheme [18],
which usually needs a longer time to collect more evidence
for calculating trust values, while a shorter time frame may
result in higher false positive rate. For example, if the detection
accuracy gets to 100%, the false positive rate is 6/23 with
pause time 100s, 7/23 with pause time 60s, and 8/23 with
pause time 40s and 20s. It is obvious that ARSoS is able to
achieve a very low false positive rate if the pause time becomes
very large, while acceptable false positive rate can be achieved
when the pause time lies in a reasonable range.
Secondly, we intentionally set a fraction of nodes to be
selfish by manipulating the parameter θ3 (assume the nodes to
be compromised by an attacker so that they did not behave as
the algorithm required). This group of nodes always intended
to save their energy by refusing to run AIDS sensors. In the
simulation, we mainly explored the relationship between the
percentage of selfish nodes and the detection performance.
Fig. 4 shows us the story: the detection performance does
not suffer sharp change when the number of selfish nodes
is not so large, e.g., the false positive is 5/23 and 6/23
(detection rate is 100%) when the number of selfish nodes is
3 and 7 respectively. However, if the number of selfish node
is 9, the false positive rate kept raising to 100% in order to
detect all the selfish nodes. So we have to claim there is a
unknown threshold determining the robustness of ARSoS. The
preliminary simulation and analysis shows that the number of
selfish nodes should be kept less than one third of the total
nodes (a typical threshold in Byzantine protocols) in order
to guarantee the detection performance. Another important
observation is that ARSoS has to undergo a longer time to
achieve an desirable performance in the presence of selfish
nodes, and the detection cost also gets more in this case,
as more normal nodes are required to run AIDS sensors for
obtaining reliable consensus strategies.
Finally, we examined whether ARSoS can contribute to
the saving of detection cost or not. Since in our simulation,
malicious nodes launched their attacks at the 150th detection
window, the detection windows from 0 to 149 can be viewed
as a training process of ARSoS. During the training, we used
reward signal rt as a metric to guide the collective behavior of
AIDS sensors. To specify the reward signal defined in Eq. (4),
we need to specify each item in this equation, including α,
Gpos, Gneg, and C. In order to make the computation simpler,
we set Gpos as detection accuracy, Gneg as false positive rate,
and C as detection overhead ratio, which is defined in [18]
as C=
∑n
i=1#msgd/
∑n
i=1#msgall (where #msgd is the
number of messages related to AIDS, and #msgall is the
number of all the messages travelling among communication
links). However, in order to observe the evolution of AIDS
sensors collective behavior for examining ARSoS’s optimality
on detection cost, we only took C as a metric for examination
during the detection stage (from detection window 150 to 250),
and the pause time was set as 100s for easier analysis (a
shorter pause time needs more detection windows for ARSoS
to get optimal policy). As shown in Fig. 5, the trend of detec-
tion overhead ratio is decreasing as time advances, even though
a number of local optimal occurred during the evolution. An
optimal policy was achieved at the 215th detection window,
where detection overhead ratio kept as 0.163.
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Fig. 4. Robustness: measuring the detection performance of ARSoS in the
scenarios where a fraction of selfish nodes refusing to run AIDS sensors even
though they are able to do so; the more selfish nodes the worse of ARSoS
detection performance and the longer time it needs to get reliable detections.
150 200 250
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.2
0.21
0.22
Detection window
D
et
ec
tio
in
 o
ve
rh
ea
d 
ra
tio
Fig. 5. Optimality: measuring the performance of ARSoS on detection
overhead ratio; for a particular network topology at time t, ARSoS tends
to maximize reward signal rt thereby reducing detection overhead
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed an automated strategy, ARSoS,
for deploying AIDS sensors in MANETs. Due to the intrinsic
characteristics of MANETs, the deployment problem was
formulated as an NP optimization problem, where the tradeoff
between detection performance and detection cost is viewed
as objective function, and practical constrains are drawn from
the observations of network nodes and communication links.
The problem was then cast in MPO-MDP framework, where
each AIDS sensor was treated as an autonomous agent, and
its detection was formulated as a Markov decision process.
A policy-gradient algorithm was applied to seek a set of
optimal parameters controlling AIDS detection policy, so
probabilistic rather than deterministic solutions were inferred
as deployment strategies. Both the theoretical analysis and
simulations validated that the proposed strategy is adaptive,
robust and near-optimal. As the subsequent work, we will de-
sign more efficient algorithms for searching parameter space,
we also need to examine more sensitive parameters that impact
AIDS detection performance and optimize them simultane-
ously. In addition, we will conduct more extensive simulations
to validate ARSoS’s performance. The adaptability, robustness,
and optimality have been examined independently, while the
hidden relationships between nodes mobility, number of AIDS
sensors, and detection cost are still unclear.
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